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 Abstract 
This paper assesses whether racial prejudice and labour market discrimination is counter-cyclical. 
This may occur if prejudice and discrimination are partly driven by competition over scarce resources, 
which intensifies during periods of economic downturn. Using British Attitudes Data spanning three 
decades, we find that prejudice does increase with unemployment rates. We find greater counter-
cyclical effects for highly-educated, middle-aged, full-time employed men. For this group, a 1%-point 
increase in unemployment raises self-reported racial prejudice by 4.1%-points. This result suggests 
that non-White workers are more likely to encounter racially prejudiced employers and managers in 
times of higher unemployment. Consistent with the estimated attitude changes, we find using the 
British Labour Force Survey that racial employment and wage gaps increase with unemployment. The 
effects for both employment and wages are largest for high-skill Black workers. For example, a 1%-
point increase in unemployment increases Black-White employment and wage gaps for the highly 
educated by 1.3%-points and 2.5%. Together, the attitude and labour market results imply that non-
Whites disproportionately suffer during recessions. It follows that recessions exacerbate existing 
racial inequalities 
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”To make matters worse, the current economic and social crises threaten to widen some 
equality gaps that might have closed in better times.” (Equality and Human Rights 
Commission, 2010) 
1. Introduction
Anecdotal evidence suggests that levels of racial prejudice have increased during the recent 
Great Recession.1 This is in line with predictions from a theoretical literature that highlights 
the propensity for prejudice to increase during periods of economic downturn due to 
increased competition for scarce resources (Levine and Campbell, 1972; Frijters, 1998; 
Smith, 2012; Caselli and Coleman, 2013). This paper investigates whether self-reported 
racial prejudice is counter-cyclical. Our measure of racial prejudice is found in British Social 
Attitudes Surveys between 1983 and 2010, and is a declaration by a respondent of being ‘not 
prejudiced at all’, ‘a little prejudiced’, or ‘very prejudiced’ against people of other races. To 
identify the effects of macroeconomic conditions, we exploit variation in unemployment rates 
across geographic regions and time. Our findings suggest that prejudice does increase with 
unemployment, with the effect owed to large increases among highly-educated, middle-aged, 
full-time employed men. For example, it is estimated for this subgroup that a 1%-point 
increase in the unemployment rate increases self-reported prejudice by approximately 4%-
points or 10% relative to mean prejudice levels.  
Importantly, the increase in racial prejudice may have deleterious labour market effects for 
non-White minorities. This follows given that educated middle-aged White men are highly 
likely to be over-represented amongst employers and managers, as well as having the most 
political power within firms. Therefore, an increase in racial prejudice among this group may 
increase labour market discrimination. Increased discrimination could be widespread and 
affect non-Whites at all levels within firms if there is a general increase in taste-based 
discrimination, or it could be concentrated among the highly skilled if the propensity to 
discriminate arises from increased competition among employees with similar positions. We 
test this hypothesis using data from the 1993-2012 versions of the Quarterly Labour Force 
Survey (QLFS). To separately identify the effects of racial prejudice from the effects of anti-
1 Examples from the popular press include: The Telegraph, 19 January 2009; Reuters, September 1 2008; The
Times 14 January 2009; The New York Times 12 September 12 2009. 
2 Some work outside economics does examine the determinants of self-reported racial prejudice using the 
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immigration attitudes, we restrict our analysis to native born individuals. The results suggest 
that non-Whites are worse off during recessionary periods in terms of employment and 
earned income. We refer to the increased racial wage gaps during periods of high 
unemployment as the ‘recession wage penalty’ (RWP), and correspondingly refer to the 
increased racial employment gaps as the ‘recession employment penalty’ (REP). 
Interestingly, the RWP is largest for older, high-skilled workers in private firms. 
Disaggregation by race reveals that Black workers have the largest RWP. For example, the 
Black-White wage gap for highly educated workers is estimated to increase by 2.5% for 
every 1%-point increase in unemployment. The REP is also highest for highly skilled 
workers; however both the Black-White and Asian-White REP are similar. In particular, the 
results imply that the probability of these groups being employed decreases by 1.3% for 
every 1%-point increase in the unemployment rate. 
 
For decades economists have developed theories of racial prejudice (Lang and Lehman, 
2012; Altonji and Blank, 1999; Arrow, 1998; Becker, 1957) and have empirically examined 
its economic consequences (Guryan and Kofi Charles, 2013; Lang and Lehmann, 2012; Fryer 
and Torelli, 2010; Ritter and Taylor, 2011; Lang and Manove, 2011; Dawkins et al, 2005; 
Lang et al, 2005; Chay, 1998; Card and Krueger, 1992; Donohue and Heckman, 1991). There 
are also large independent literatures investigating the determinants of social attitudes, 
including attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policy (Quillian’s, 1995; Dustmann 
and Preston, 2005; Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Pettigrew 1998; Mayda 2006; Hainmueller 
and Hiscox 2007; Facchini and Mayda, 2009). However, despite these influential literatures 
there is little economic research on the determinants of self-reported racial prejudice. 
Understanding the economic determinants of prejudicial attitudes is therefore academically 
valuable, as is exploring how racial prejudice may translate into worse labour market 
outcomes for non-Whites.  
 
Our findings also have implications for policies targeting ethnic minorities residing in 
Britain. This arises because of already existing inequalities: minorities live in worse housing 
(Phillips and Harrison; 2010), are taught by lower quality teachers (Clotfelter et al; 2004) and 
are in worse health (Lordan and Johnston, 2011and Bollini and Harold, 1995). Additionally, 
the unemployment rate of minorities in Britain has been approximately double that of Whites 
over the last 40 years, with only half of this gap explained by residential segregation, 
education differences and other observable factors (Leslie et al, 2001; Blackaby et al, 2002 
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and Heath and Li, 2007). Higher levels of racial prejudice widen this gap, and thus the recent 
recession may have reversed some of the gains made during the past decades (Equality and 
Human Rights Commission, 2010).   
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we provide a background 
for our study by discussing theoretical and empirical work related to prejudicial attitudes and 
discrimination. In Section 3 we describe the British Social Attitudes data, along with our 
methodology. We also document the results for the empirical work on attitudes. In section 4 
we describe the data sources used to consider labour market impacts, methodology and 
results. The final section is a discussion.  
 
2. Racial Prejudice and Discrimination 
 
For many years economists have been interested in a diverse range of individual attitudes and 
values (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; O’ Rourke and Sinnott, 
2001). However, to our knowledge economists have never empirically examined the 
determinants of self-reported racial prejudice.2 This is puzzling, because many economic 
studies examine attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policy (Quillian’s, 1995; 
Dustmann and Preston, 2006; Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Pettigrew 1998; Mayda 2006; 
Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Facchini and Mayda, 2009). Particularly relevant studies 
include Lahav (2004), who finds that immigration attitudes are related to perceptions of 
economic conditions, Kesslar and Freeman (2005), who find that as economic conditions 
worsen so does public opinion towards migrants, and Dustmann and Preston (2007), who 
demonstrate that racial prejudice and anti-immigration attitudes are strongly related in the 
UK. 
   
The dearth of economic studies is also puzzling given the importance of prejudicial attitudes 
in shaping the life chances of ethnic minorities. For example, racial prejudice has been 
suggested as an important causal factor in determining policies that target minorities (Bobo, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Some work outside economics does examine the determinants of self-reported racial prejudice using the 
British Social Attitudes Survey. However, this work focuses on the correlations between individual and 
household characteristics and prejudicial attitudes (Evans 2002; Rothon and Heath 2003; Ford 2008). For 
example, Ford (2008) reports low self-reported prejudice amongst the highly educated, the professional classes 
and women.	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1991; Sears, 1988).  Additionally, lower levels of racial prejudice have been directly linked to 
support for the Welfare State in Britain (Ford, 2006). Elsewhere, Dustmann and Preston, 
(2007) find that racial concerns are an important pathway through which opinion towards 
immigration policies are formed. Prejudice and subsequent discriminatory practices have also 
been linked to residential segregation (Zubrinsky, 2000 and Zubrinsky and Bobo, 1996), 
poorer health outcomes (Johnston and Lordan, 2012 and Lauderale, 2006) as well as worse 
labour market outcomes (Charles and Guryan, 2008 and Goldsmith et al, 2006). Therefore, 
shifts in racial prejudice during recessionary periods could worsen already existing racial 
inequalities in a number of domains.   
 
While no economic study empirically examines the determinants of self-reported racial 
prejudice, there are several related economic literatures. For instance a number of papers 
examine the macroeconomic determinants of racially-motivated crime. The closest example 
to our study is Falk et al. (2011), who find a significantly positive relationship between 
regional unemployment and the incidence of right-wing extremist crime in Germany. The 
authors hypothesise that the fear of losing a job increases with unemployment, and that this 
fear lowers tolerance and altruism. Another close example is Antecol and Cobb-Clark (2010), 
who in contrast find little evidence that racial hostility towards off-base Army personnel is 
related to local economic vulnerability (measured by the unemployment rate, poverty rate, 
and income inequality). This finding of weak relationships with macroeconomic conditions is 
common in the racially-motivated crime literature. For example, macroeconomic conditions 
are found to be only weakly related to the incidence of anti-foreigner crime in Germany 
(Krueger and Pischke, 1997), hate crimes in New York (Green et al. 1998), race riots in the 
US (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1998), and racial harassment in Britain (Dustmann et al., 2011). 
We note that physical violence is a very particular and extreme manifestation of racial 
prejudice, and it is therefore unclear how relevant these results are for our study.   
 
Another related literature theoretically models racial discrimination, scarcity and conflict. For 
example, Frijters (1998) argues that job uncertainty and scarcity encourages groups of 
individuals to form coalitions based on observed recognizable characteristics, such as race. 
Individuals then hire persons from within their own coalition in an attempt to capture all the 
scarce jobs and ensure future labour market success. Smith (2012) builds on the social 
identity literature, which finds that people favour members of their own group at the expense 
of members of other groups, even if securing this outcome creates economic inefficiencies. 
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He finds that the competition for scarce resources can induce agents without discriminatory 
attitudes to aggressively discriminate. Finally, Caselli and Coleman (2013) consider ethnic 
conflict. In their model, ethnicity provides a means for group membership and exclusion, 
which limits the ability of the losing groups to access the spoils of conflict, such as land titles 
or government jobs. More generally, there are large literatures in sociology and anthropology 
based on the theory that discrimination is the result of competition over scarce resources, the 
effects of which are exacerbated during periods of economic downturn (see Green et al. 
1998).  
 
A final related literature considers how the business cycle affects racial wage gaps. Early 
studies relied on aggregate time series data and examined the ratio of annual earnings for the 
discriminated group compared to the majority group (Ashenfelter, 1970; Freeman, 1973; 
O’Neill, 1985).  None of these studies found empirical evidence of pro- or counter-cyclical 
‘pure’ wage discrimination. Biddle and Hammermesh (2013) provide the most relevant 
contribution by considering wage discrimination over the business cycle in the US using the 
Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups from 1979 through 2009. 
They find evidence that there is a counter-cyclical wage gap for African-Americans, but that 
this is mostly owed to composition effects. They also find an opposite pro-cyclical wage gap 
for Hispanics, but the effect is only marginally significant. There is also a notable 
contribution in the immigration literature by Dustmann et al. (2010). The study compares 
natives and immigrants from OECD and non-OECD countries in Germany and the UK, and 
highlights counter-cyclical unemployment effects for immigrants that are particularly 
pronounced for those from non-OECD countries. 
 
Based on this empirical and theoretical research, we hypothesis that macroeconomic 
conditions can alter an individual’s prejudicial attitudes. In particular, we envisage that each 
individual has a baseline level of prejudice that is affected by the degree to which they are 
experiencing ‘bad economic times’ and have to compete over scarce resources. In recessions, 
when lay-offs and wage cuts are more common, we expect individuals become less tolerant 
towards people of other ethnicities. This is in line with the Caselli and Coleman (2013) 
theoretical model, whereby ethnicity provides a means for group membership and exclusion. 
In addition, it is also an explanation as to why those who are low educated and working have 
relatively high-level levels of intolerance regardless of the unemployment rate. That is, they 
are routinely experiencing bad economic times (see Figure 1 which we will subsequently 
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discuss). It is not necessary to make an assumption as to whether long-run baseline prejudice 
levels are high (becoming low when an individual experiences good economic fortune) or 
low (becoming high when an individual experiences bad economic fortune). In this work we 
are simply interested in examining whether prejudice is more prevalent in the community 
during periods of high unemployment.   
  
We also hypothesise that different sub-groups of society more readily alter their attitudes as 
unemployment rises. This fits with the aforementioned work and the findings of Mayda 
(2006), who finds that anti-immigration attitudes heighten when an individual’s own 
circumstances are most threatened by immigration. It also fits with our hypothesis that 
tolerance is a function of one’s own individual circumstances. Thus, those who are 
experiencing good economic times prior to the recession are likely to become more intolerant 
towards ethnic minorities, particularly if they are competing alongside these groups in a work 
environment for income and employment opportunities. Thus, high-skilled individuals would 
become more prejudiced if ethnic minorities were also high-skilled. In the UK, native ethnic 
minorities have spent more years overall in school and possess a higher number of degree 
qualifications than native Whites (Blackaby et al, 2002; Gillborn and Gipps, 1996 and 
Modood et al, 1997).  If we consider the Labour Force Survey data from 1993-2012, which 
we describe later, Blacks have slightly higher education than Whites in terms of degree 
attainment, while Asians and other ethnicities have much higher education levels. 
Additionally, Dustmann and Fabbri (2006) highlight that in the UK immigrants have higher 
levels of skill and education, than immigrants in other developed countries. Their work also 
indicates that the immigration attitudes of the educated are most influenced by economic 
factors.  
 
3. Estimating Racial Prejudice over the Business Cycle 
 
3.1. Data 
Our data is drawn from the British Social Attitudes (BSA) Survey, which is a mostly annual 
series initiated in 1983. The exceptions are 1992 and 1998 when the BSA was not conducted. 
Each year the BSA Survey asks over 3,000 people questions that gauge their social, political 
and moral attitudes. Participants are selected using random probability sampling which 
ensures that the survey is representative of the British population. The key racial prejudice 
question was included in all years apart from 1993, 1995 and 1997, and states:  
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“How would you describe yourself? (1) not prejudiced at all, (2) a little prejudiced, or (3) 
very prejudiced, against people of other races?”.  
 
The relative frequencies of responses (1), (2) and (3) are 66%, 30% and 4%, respectively. 
Given the low frequencies associated with response (3), we aggregate the responses “a little 
prejudiced” and “very prejudiced” to create a binary outcome variable measuring any 
prejudice.  
 
Figure 1 presents mean levels of this measure by some key demographics.3 These graphs 
demonstrate three interesting features. First, the highly educated report less prejudice. This is 
consistent with the highly educated being more tolerant (Sullivan and Transue, 1999 and 
Hello et al, 2006). Second, those not working report less prejudice than those who are 
working (or equal in the case of highly educated females). Note that the non-working group 
consists predominantly of retirees and home-makers, with the unemployed a relative 
minority. Third, males report more prejudice than females. This is consistent with Lubbers et 
al (2002), and Johnson and Marini (1998). Combined, these relationships imply that low-
educated working males are the most prejudiced (42%) and high-educated women are the 
least prejudiced (25%).  
 
It is likely that self-reported prejudice is a biased measure of true prejudice due to people 
voicing a different attitude publicly (to the interviewer) than they hold privately. That is, self-
reported prejudicial attitudes are likely under-reported (Rudman et al, 2001). However, Evans 
(2002) highlights that the self-reported prejudice variable in the BSA is correlated closely 
with other indicators of racial intolerance, and we expect those with the highest level of 
prejudice to declare. Additionally, the tendency to under-report owing to social desirability is 
unlikely to be associated with the prevailing unemployment rate, unless the unemployment 
rate has a strongly significant effect on the level of prejudicial attitudes within the general 
community. We do note that it is possible that during recessions some media outlets and 
political groups increasingly discuss ethnic minorities in a critical manner. Subsequently, 
individuals may be more likely to declare their pre-existing prejudice as they deem such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In Figure 1 those who have achieved a CSE, O level or GCSE are described as having medium education, and 
those with an A-level or degree are described as highly educated. All others are described as possessing low 
levels of education.  
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views as more appropriate. Here we argue that this still represents a change in levels of racial 
tolerance, given that being willing to declare one’s prejudice also implies an increased 
probability of acting upon it. Finally, the tendency to under-report should bias the estimated 
relationship between unemployment rates and attitudes downwards (towards zero). 
 
Overall the data comprises 23 survey years, and eleven areas within the UK. These areas are: 
North East England, North West England, Yorkshire and Humber, East Midlands, West 
Midlands, South West England, East of England, London, South East England, Wales and 
Scotland. Official unemployment rate data is only available for these areas from 1992, and so 
to construct area-level unemployment rates for 1983-1991 we use area-level information on 
the numbers of claimants for Job Seekers Allowance (JSA). The difficulty is that claimant 
rates are not necessarily equivalent to unemployment rates, because some of the unemployed 
are ineligible for or may not claim unemployment benefits. To control for this difference, we 
construct area-level unemployment rates by multiplying the area-level claimant rate with the 
ratio of national unemployment rates to national claimant rates.  That is, for the period 1983-
1991 the unemployment rate used in this work is derived as !"!"# ∙ !"!" !"!", where !"!"# is 
the area-level claimant rate, and !"!" and !"!" are the national unemployment and claimant 
rates, respectively.4  
 
Figure 2 presents the national self-reported racial prejudice series across time. It shows a 
general downward trend across the 1980s and 1990s, followed by an upward trend in the 
2000s. The upward trend may have been partly caused by the world-wide increase in 
terrorism during this period. Another interesting feature is the sharp uptake in the early 
1990s. This corresponds with a period of high unemployment in Britain; the national 
unemployment rate peaked at 10.8% in early 1993. Figure 3 presents the estimated cross-
sectional relationship between self-reported racial prejudice and unemployment using 
between area variation (an Epanechnikov kernel function and a rule-of-thumb bandwidth are 
used). The non-parametric estimates are presented for four labour market groups: employed, 
unemployed, retired, and all others, which are primarily home makers. The figure shows a 
strong positive relationship between racial prejudice and unemployment for workers across 
all UR values. There is also a positive relationship for the unemployed, but this exists only up 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This approach follows advice received from the Office of National Statistics. It assumes that there is no 
difference between the divergence of claimant and unemployment rates across areas 
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until an UR of 8%. The relationships are weak for retirees and homemakers. Though it is 
difficult to draw any firm conclusions from cross-sectional correlations, this figure suggests it 
may be important to consider heterogeneity in the underlying relationship. This is in line with 
our hypothesis that self reported prejudice may be more likely to change for some groups in 
society more than others during recessions.  
 
3.2. Methodology 
 
To model the effects of macroeconomic conditions on the racial prejudice of White 
respondents, we use a linear regression model with area-specific intercepts and area-specific 
linear time trends:   
 !"!"# = !!"!" + !!"!! + !! + !!! + !!!! + !!"#     (1)  
 
where !"!"# is the reported racial prejudice of individual i residing in area a in year y, !"!" 
is the area-level unemployment rate, !!"#is a vector of individual-level control variables, !! 
is a year fixed-effect, !!! is a area-specific intercept, !!!! is an area-specific time-trend, and !!"#  is a random disturbance term. Standard errors are clustered by area to allow for 
correlation between disturbances across years within areas. 
 
Area-level intercepts (fixed-effects) are included in equation (1) as it is likely that racial 
prejudice is influenced by local factors. Area-specific linear time trends are also included 
because it is plausible that there has been a trend across time towards the acceptance of other 
ethnicities, and that the slope of this trend may differ by area. More generally, area-specific 
trends can capture time-variant unobservable factors that are associated with both prejudice 
and unemployment. Given the inclusion of area-level intercepts and area-specific time trends, 
the effect of the unemployment rate on prejudice is identified by within-area variations in 
unemployment in relation to within-area variation in prejudice around its trend.5  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 We have also estimated models with area-specific covariates that control for the effects that the September 11 
2001 terrorist attacks and subsequent events may have had on racial prejudice. These covariates amount to the 
addition of the term !!! ∙ Ι ! > 2001  to equation (1), where Ι ∙  is an indicator function that equals one if the 
argument is true and zero otherwise. 
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The vector of individual-level control variables (!!"#) includes, gender, age, age-squared, 
number of children, marital status (married, separated/divorced/widowed or single), 
employment status (full-time employed, part-time employed, unemployed, retired, full time 
student, with all others (mostly home-makers) as the control group), log of household income 
and log of household income squared (in 2010 prices). To the extent that voting preference 
can capture some propensity of an individual to be more or less liberal (Pallage and 
Zimmermann, 2006), or indeed their personality in general (Schoen and Schumann, 2007 and 
Caprara et al, 1999), we include dummies indicating if a person either has no party allegiance 
or votes for: Labour, Alliance, or ‘other party’ (Conservative is thus the reference group). 
Appendix Table A1 reports the sample means of these variables by ‘not prejudiced’ and 
‘prejudiced’.   
 
Particularly important covariates are the education variables, which are used to define 
estimation subgroups. Those with A-levels or a university degree are described as highly 
educated. In the UK, students completing A-levels stay in school until roughly 18 years and 
generally aim for third level education. Those who have achieved a certificate of secondary 
education (CSE), O-levels or a general certificate of secondary education (GCSE) are 
described as having medium education (CSE and O-levels were replaced by the GCSE in 
1988). All three qualifications represent a low-level secondary school qualification that is 
usually achieved when the student is aged 15. Individuals without any qualification are 
described as possessing low levels of education. This classification approach generates three 
education groups of roughly equivalent sample size. Importantly, education information is 
missing from the BSA Survey in years 1983 and 1984, and therefore the regression sample 
begins in 1985. 
 
3.3. Results 
 
Table 1 presents coefficient estimates for equation (1), separately by males and females. The 
coefficient on the unemployment rate equals 0.004 for males and is significant at the 10% 
level. This implies that self-reported prejudice increases by 0.4%-points when the UR 
increases by 1%-point, suggesting there is only a small increase in male racial prejudice 
during economic downturns. For females the estimated unemployment effect equals 0.003 
and is not statistically significant. We draw similar conclusions if we do not collapse our self-
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reported prejudice measure (not prejudiced at all, a little prejudiced, very prejudiced) into a 
binary indicator and instead use an ordered probit model (estimated coefficient for men 
equals 0.008 and its p-value equals 0.061). 
 
The control variables coefficients in Table 1 highlight that male full-time workers, and 
female full-time and part-time workers are more likely to be racially prejudiced than the 
control group.6 Relative to those with low education, the highly educated are less likely to 
report racial prejudice, and the medium educated are more likely to report racial prejudice. 
For income our results imply that middle-income households are most likely to be racially 
prejudiced. This is evidenced by the inverse-U relationship between income and prejudice. 
Voting preference is also indicative of prejudicial attitudes. Table 1 reveals that Labour and 
Alliance voters report being less racially prejudiced than conservative voters regardless of 
gender. This is also the case for those who report having no political allegiance.7  
 
As discussed in Section 2, we are interested in how the prejudicial attitudes of different sub-
groups change with the business cycle. In particular, we hypothesise that the counter-cyclical 
relationship will be strongest for high-skilled workers (e.g. more experienced and better 
educated). Ethnic minorities who are native to Britain have higher education than White 
natives, and therefore in periods of economic downturn the labour market competition 
between ethnic minorities and Whites will be most intense for high-skilled workers. Note that 
this dynamic is relatively unique to the UK. For example, in the United States both native and 
immigrant ethnic minorities are lower skilled than White. In this context, studies have 
concluded that fears about the adverse effects of labour-market competition are the cause of 
anti-immigration attitudes among low-skilled, blue collar workers (Scheve and Slaughter, 
2001; Mayda, 2006).  
 
In Table 2 we present estimated UR coefficients separately by age (18-34, 35-64 and 65+), 
education level (low, medium, high) and employment status (full-time, full-time or part-time, 
not employed, retired). Considering age, the only statistically significant effect is for males 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This gender difference is perhaps owed to it being more common in the UK for females to be part-time 
employed than in other countries and in comparison to males (Manning  and Petrongolo, 2008)  
7 It is possible that political allegiance may be driven by prejudicial attitudes and as such this set of variables 
may be endogenous. Omitting them from the regression models, however, has very little impact on the 
remaining estimated coefficients. 
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aged 35-64. For this group, the estimate of 0.017 implies racial prejudice increases by 1.7%-
points for every 1%-point increase in UR. Or to put it another way, for a 4%-point increase in 
UR (as seen in the most recent recessionary period) it is estimated that 7 additional men out 
of every 100 self-report racial prejudice. The sub-analysis by education reveals that racial 
prejudice is indeed most strongly counter-cyclical for the high education group. The 
estimated effects for males and females equal 0.013 and 0.016. With respect to employment 
status, Table 2 reveals that prejudice attitudes are counter-cyclical for working males. If we 
consider full-time working males, the results imply that a 4%-point increase in UR increases 
racial prejudice by almost 7%-points.8 
 
To explore this finding further, the bottom panel of Table 2 presents additional sub-group 
analysis based on interactions between age, education and employment. The results show that 
for men the UR effect is large and statistically significant for each interacted sub-group. The 
effect is particular large in the final row, which presents estimates for the highly educated 
that are full-time employed and aged 35-64. The estimate suggests that a 4%-point increase in 
UR increases racial prejudice by 16%-points. This is a 45% increase relative to the mean 
racial prejudice for this group of 36%. For females, racial prejudice is also most strongly 
counter-cyclical for the highly educated that are full-time employed and aged 35-64. The 
estimate suggests that a 4%-point increase in UR increases racial prejudice by 8%-points. 
Given that the average individual in this sub-group is relatively high-skilled, these finding 
concur with our hypothesis that racial prejudice is most strongly counter-cyclical for high-
skilled workers. 
 
Importantly, an alternative explanation is possible for the results presented in Tables 1 and 2. 
Prejudice levels amongst workers may increase during recessions if individuals with 
relatively low levels of racial prejudice are more likely to become unemployed than 
individuals with high levels of racial prejudice. This systematic selection out of employment 
is plausible if prejudiced workers cooperate together and compete against more tolerant 
individuals for scarce resources. In this scenario, individual-level prejudice may not have 
increased during recessions; however, it is still the case that the likelihood of encountering a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Including area-specific controls for the sharp increase in racial prejudice post September 11 2001 does not 
alter these results. 
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prejudiced colleague, manager or employer has increased. Thus, we still view this as a 
worrisome change. 
 
In Tables 1 and 2 the unemployment rate is defined as the average rate of unemployment for 
all individuals residing in a particular area in a particular year. This may not, however, be the 
most suitable measure for each subgroup. It is possible that the relevant measure for a 
subgroup is not the area-year average across all individuals, but rather the area-year average 
across only those individuals belonging to the subgroup (e.g. unemployment rate for highly 
educated men aged 35-64). This measure may more adequately capture labour market 
competition. Unfortunately, heterogeneous unemployment rates by region-year are 
unavailable; the areas and survey years in the British Labour Force Survey only partially 
match those in the BSA, preventing us from performing our own calculations. Nevertheless, 
we can demonstrate that the area-year average UR is a significant predictor of employment 
outcomes for all subgroups and is therefore relevant. For example, using the same fixed-
effect methodology as used in Tables 1 and 2, we find that the unemployment rate has a 
significantly negative effect on the full-time employment probabilities of low (-0.029), 
medium (-0.011) and high (-0.006) education subgroups. 
 
The results in Tables 1 and 2 are also robust to alternative model specifications (see 
Appendix Table A2). First, the continuous measure of UR was replaced with dummies 
representing the UR groupings of 5-8%, 8-11% and >11% (<5% was the omitted comparison 
group). The estimated effects for the high-skilled subgroup (i.e. highly educated, full-time 
employed and aged 35-64) equal 0.032, 0.087 and 0.183. Second, lagged UR variables 
(!"!"!!, !"!"!!) were added to the specification. The dynamic specifications suggest that 
the UR effect is largely contemporaneous. For the high-skilled subgroup the estimated effects 
for !"!", !"!"!! and !"!"!! equal 0.041, -0.003 and 0.007, respectively. Finally, using a 
three year average of UR, which should reduce measurement error, counter-intuitively 
reduces the estimated UR effect for some sub-groups; however, the effect for the high-skilled 
subgroup remains strong (0.046). 
 
Finally, we can show that unemployment also has an effect on expectations of future 
prejudice rates in Britain. In addition to the question on own racial prejudice, the BSA asks 
respondents “Do you think there is generally more racial prejudice in Britain now  than there 
was 5 years ago?” with the respondent given the following response options:  “less”, “more” 
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or “about the same amount”?, and “Do you think there will be more, less, or about the same 
amount of racial prejudice in Britain in 5 years time compared with now?”. In Appendix 
Table A3 we present the estimated effects of UR on a binary variable indicating that the 
respondent believes there is less prejudice now than 5 years ago, and on a binary variable 
indicating that the respondent believes there will be less prejudice in 5 years time. The results 
show that an increase in UR significantly reduces the probability that the respondent believes 
there will be less prejudice in 5 years time: the estimated effect for the high-skilled subgroup 
defined above equals -0.017 (relative to a mean of 0.22). In other words, higher 
unemployment rates now lead people to expect higher levels of racial prejudice in the future.  
 
4. Estimating Labour Market Discrimination over the Business Cycle 
 
The results in the previous section highlight that males aged 35-64 that are highly educated 
workers have the most pronounced counter-cyclical racial prejudice. Or, at least there is a 
larger proportion of intolerant highly educated males in employment during recessions. 
Assuming these individuals are more likely to be managers, bosses and/or have political 
power within organisations, should they act on their increased taste for discrimination, this 
will translate into worse labour market outcomes for non-Whites during periods of high 
unemployment. In other words, counter-cyclical racial prejudice could lead to counter-
cyclical labour market discrimination. The worsening may perpetrate all levels of the 
organisation if there is an increase in ‘pure’ discrimination, however it will be concentrated 
among the highly skilled if the propensity to discriminate arises from increased competition. 
That is, in the first case those with increased prejudice discriminate against anyone who is of 
a particular ethnic minority regardless of personal gains, as they gain utility from their 
discriminatory actions. In the second case, discrimination is targeted towards those at their 
own skill level. This may be viewed as ‘rational’ discrimination, because if successful it 
results in the person’s own job and the jobs of their group members being more secure 
(Frijters, 1998).  
 
It is important to note that the racial labour market gaps that we can identify here could be 
counter-cyclical in the absence of counter-cyclical racial prejudice. An alternative 
explanation is that the costs of discriminatory behaviour could be lower during periods of 
high unemployment (Biddle and Hamermesh, 2013; Baert et al. 2013). Hiring a less qualified 
White applicant generates costs in terms of foregone production, and turning away a qualified 
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non-White applicant generates additional search costs. During economic downturns there is a 
greater pool of White applicants to employ, and therefore employers with a taste for 
discrimination can more easily find qualified White workers.  
 
4.1. Data 
 
Our data source for measuring labour market discrimination is the 1993-2012 versions of the 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). The QLFS is the main survey of individual 
economic activity in the UK, and provides the official measure of the national unemployment 
rate. We consider wage and employment differences between native Whites and native non-
Whites, and exclude all immigrants from the analysis. We make this selection decision 
because non-White immigrants have significantly lower observed and unobserved human 
capital than native Whites and non-Whites; they generally have lower levels of formal 
education, lack English language skills, are unfamiliar with local customs and work in 
unskilled jobs (Berthoud, 2000; Heath and Cheung, 2007). In addition, the composition of the 
immigrant work force is likely to change over the business cycle, with average immigrant 
human capital levels moving with the needs of the economy. This arises given that natives 
are likely to have more ties to their area of residence than non-natives. Individuals are 
identified as being native to the UK based on their country of birth and we include all 
respondents aged 18-65 years. We choose to focus on both employment and income as it is 
plausible that there is heterogeneity in the results for these outcomes across worker groups. 
For example, the recession wage penalty (RWP) may be worse for highly educated non-
Whites whilst the recession employment penalty (REP) may be worse for non-Whites with 
low education levels. For the purpose of our analysis we generate quarterly unemployment 
rates specific to 19 geographic regions.9  
 
4.2. Methodology 
 
To model the effects of macroeconomic conditions on ethnic employment and wage 
differentials, we use a linear regression model with intercepts specific to each region of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The geographic regions are: Tyne and Wear; Rest of North East, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, Rest of 
North West, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Rest of Yorkshire and Humberside, East Midlands, West 
Midlands Metropolitan County, Rest of West Midlands, East of England, Inner London, Outer London, South 
East, South West, Wales, Strathclyde, and Rest of Scotland. 
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residence and quarter:   
 !" !!"# = !!"!"# + ! !"!" ∙ !"!"# + !!"#! + !!" + !!"#   (2)  
 
where !!"# is either the wages of individual i residing in area a in quarter q or an indicator as 
to whether they are in employment, !"!!" is a dummy representing non-White workers 
(disaggregated racial identifiers are used in some specifications), !!"#  is a vector of 
individual-level control variables, !!" is an area-quarter fixed-effect, and !!"# is a random 
disturbance term. Standard errors are clustered by area-quarter to allow for correlation 
between individuals within the same area and quarter. 
 
Area-quarter intercepts (fixed-effects) are included in equation (2) to control for any 
differences in wages and employment across areas and time – this approach amounts to the 
inclusion of 1482 area-quarter dummy variables. This approach is feasible because the main 
variable of interest is the interaction term !"!" ∙ !"!"#, which varies across individuals 
within the same area-quarter. The large number of area-quarter terms does however rule out 
the use of a probit modelling approach for the employment outcome. Consequently, we use 
linear models for both employment and log wage outcomes. Note also that the pure 
unemployment rate effect on wages is not identified, as all individuals in the same area-
quarter face the same rate. We feel it is preferable to adequately control for differences in 
outcomes across areas and time, than to include a higher-level fixed-effect term (such as area 
level intercepts) and identify the pure unemployment rate effect.10  
 
A coefficient of interest in equation (2) is !, which provides a measure of the wage gap 
between Whites and non-Whites. Typically, the racial wage gap is negative, indicating that 
non-Whites earn less than Whites; though, given we have omitted all immigrants this may not 
hold true in our analysis. Importantly, the interaction term is constructed such that ! 
represents the wage gap at mean levels of UR. Another coefficient of interest is !, which 
we’ve labelled the RWP in the case of wages and the REP in the case of employment. In the 
case of wages, this term measures how the percentage difference in wages between native 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 We note that all conclusions are robust to relaxing this assumption, with the estimates from this preferred 
model being the most conservative. 
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Whites and non-Whites (wage gap) changes with each 1%-point change in UR. A negative 
value of ! means an increase in UR worsens the wage gap between Whites and non-Whites, 
implying counter-cyclical discrimination. Conversely, a positive value of ! implies pro-
cyclical discrimination. In a similar vein, the REP measures how the percentage difference in 
the probability of being employed between native Whites and non-Whites (employment gap) 
changes with each 1%-point change in UR.  
 
The vector of individual-level control variables (!!"#) includes, age, age squared, education 
level (low, (control group), medium and high), marital status (single (control group), married, 
separated/divorced/widowed) and the number of children. For the wage regressions only we 
also include usual hours and usual hours squared as controls. These hours covariates are 
included because there is a tendency for ethnic minorities to participate in part-time work 
more frequently than Whites (Blackaby et al, 2002); though in practice they make little 
quantitative difference to the estimates of !. 
 
4.3. Results 
 
Table 3 presents estimates of equation (2) for the employment and log wage outcomes, 
separately by males and females. 11  The four coefficients pertaining to the non-White 
indicator suggest that non-Whites have worse labour market outcomes than Whites overall. 
Specifically, non-White males are 14%-points less likely to be employed and their wages are 
11% lower than White males (at mean levels of UR). Non-White females are 9%-points less 
likely to be employed and their wages are 2.5% lower than White females. However, these 
estimated gaps must be interpreted with caution as they may not solely be caused by 
discrimination (taste-based or statistical), even when considering a sample of natives only. 
Alternative explanations are that non-Whites have lower levels of unobserved human capital 
and that non-Whites systematically prefer occupations or sectors with lower average pay (due 
to differences in tastes or risk preferences).  
 
Coefficients on the non-White UR interaction term are also significantly negative. For males 
the employment gap (14%-points) and wage gap (11%) increase by 0.6%-points and 1.2% for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The estimated wage effects of our control variables are all consistent with previous studies. Age has a 
negative quadratic correlation, and education, marriage and children have a positive correlation. 
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a 1%-point increase in UR. For females, the employment gap (9%-points) is not affected by 
UR, while the wage gap (2.5%) increases by 1.4% for a 1%-point increase in UR.12 For a 4%-
point increase in UR (as seen in the recent recession) these estimates imply that relative 
wages decrease by about 5% for both genders. These estimates are less likely to suffer from 
omitted variable bias (composition effects) than the estimated average gaps, because 
unobserved human capital or preference differences between native Whites and non-Whites 
are unlikely to be associated with differences in area-level unemployment rates.13 This 
contrasts with analogous immigration studies in which the systematic self-selection of 
immigrants into high wage areas is a genuine concern. An approach used in the immigration 
literature to mitigate the bias is to examine only the sub-group of immigrants who have been 
living in the country for many years (e.g. Dustmann et al., 2010). This approach is based on 
the assumption that the current residential location of these established immigrants is less 
likely to be based upon cyclical macroeconomic conditions. This is an assumption similar to 
our own. Another approach is to examine more homogenous groups of employees. The idea 
is that the likelihood of omitted variable bias (unobserved human capital differences) is 
lessened if identification comes from comparisons between workers in similar age, education 
and occupation groups. We implement this approach below. 
 
Table 4 presents the results from a sub-group analysis for men (age, education, occupation, 
work hours, sector). We focus on males given that the employment selection issues are far 
less severe than for females. The results between genders are however generally consistent. 
The equivalent female results are included in Appendix Tables A4 and A5. In Table 4 we 
report the coefficient on the non-White dummy variable that captures the racial 
wage/employment gap and the interaction term that captures the RWP/REP. The non-White 
dummy variable is negative and significant for all sub-groups in both the employment and 
wage models. For employment it is particularly large for the 18-34 age group (-0.156) and for 
the medium education group (-0.176). For wages it is particularly large for the 35-64 age 
group (-0.124), medium and high education groups (-0.105 and -0.104) and for workers in 
private firms (-0.120).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The results in Table 4 pertain to the probability of being employed, but for some readers it may be also 
interesting to consider the association with unemployment. Although not shown here, the estimates are very 
similar in magnitude (but opposite in sign) to the employment results.  
13 More specifically, our estimates would be partly driven by bias if non-White workers with high unobserved 
human capital systematically move to relatively low UR areas at higher rates than White workers and non-White 
workers with low unobserved human capital. 
	   21	  
 
More relevant are the estimated coefficients on the interaction term UR · Non-White. For 
both employment and wages, this interaction term is larger for older individuals (-0.008 and -
0.017) and highly educated individuals (-0.012 and -0.015). The estimated wage effects 
(RWPs) are also larger for high-skilled non-manual workers (-0.014) and private workers (-
0.016). The difference between part-time and full-time workers is small and not statistically 
significant. Overall, these results suggest that high-skilled non-White workers, whether 
defined by experience (age), education or occupation, suffer the most during recessions.14 If 
we estimate the RWP for the combined high-skill group – aged 35-64, high education levels, 
high-skill non-manual occupation – the estimated RWP equals 2.7% (p-value = 0.003). This 
estimate implies that male non-White relative wages decrease by around 11% with a 4%-
point increase in UR, and increase the racial wage gap from a comparatively low 6% to a 
high 17%. 
 
Next we explore the potential for heterogeneity across the non-White sub-groups by 
disaggregating this broad classification into three groupings: Blacks, Asians (Indian, 
Pakistani or Bangladeshi) and other ethnicities (including Chinese).15 Practically, we replace 
the non-White dummy variable in equation (2) with dummy variables representing these 
three sub-groups. Similarly, we replace the interaction between non-Whites and UR with 
three interaction terms. The results are documented in Table 5 for our full sample as well as a 
sub-analysis for older and highly educated individuals. These two subgroups were chosen 
because their estimated effects in Table 4 were particularly large. 
 
The disaggregated results reveal that the effect of the unemployment rate (interaction terms) 
on employment and log wages is larger for Black men (-0.011 and -0.014) than for Asian 
men (-0.004 and -0.010) and other non-White men (-0.003 and -0.011). The difference 
between the non-White sub-groups is particularly large for highly educated workers. The 
coefficient of -0.025 for the UR · Black interaction term implies that the Black relative wages 
decrease by 2.5% for a 1%-point increase in the unemployment rate. For a 4%-point increase 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Using the natural log of the unemployment rather than UR, as is familiar in the wage curve literature, does not 
alter these results. 
15 We follow the common practice used in British surveys of labelling individuals from the Indian subcontinent 
countries of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh as ‘Asian’, and treating these individuals separately to those from 
other countries in Asia (e.g. China). 
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in UR (as seen in the most recent recessionary period) it is estimated that the Black wage gap 
increases from 19% (at average UR levels of 6.4) to 29%. These wage effects are much larger 
than for Asian men (-0.010) and other non-White men (-0.005). 
 
Conclusions 	  
This paper investigates whether self-reported racial prejudice is counter-cyclical. We find 
only small general population increases in prejudice during periods of high unemployment.  
However, we find large increases for White males who are full-time employed, have high 
levels of education and are middle aged. The increase is especially large for the interaction of 
these groups. The effect for females who are middle aged, highly educated and in full-time 
employment is also significant, albeit half the size of the male effect. If these individuals are 
employers, managers, or have political power within organisations, and act on their increased 
taste for discrimination, this will translate into worse labour market outcomes for non-Whites 
during periods of high unemployment. We note that these results may be also be explained by 
more tolerant high-skill individuals losing their employment during recessions; however, 
even in this case, the results imply that there are relatively more prejudiced workers during 
recessions. This attitude shift may affect ethnic minorities at all levels of an organisation if 
there is an increase in ‘pure’ discrimination, however it will be concentrated among the 
highly skilled if the propensity to discriminate arises from increased competition only. 
Therefore, the second part of the paper investigates whether racial labour market gaps are 
significantly related to unemployment rates, and how the relationship varies across 
subgroups. 
 
Our empirical analysis of the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLSF) highlights that there are 
significant differences in employment and wages between Whites and non-Whites, and that 
these gaps significantly increase with the unemployment rate (counter-cyclical). Specifically, 
we find the recession employment and wage penalties are the greatest for non-White workers 
with high skill levels, particularly for males. For example, the estimated RWP for men aged 
35-64 with high education levels working in high-skill non-manual occupations equals 2.7%, 
implying that non-White relative wages decrease by around 11% with a 4%-point increase in 
UR, as seen in the recent Great Recession. Further analysis reveals that Black workers suffer 
larger RWPs than other non-White workers.  
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Overall, the attitudes and labour market results support the hypothesis that racial prejudice is 
driven partly by increased labour market competition between racial groups during periods of 
high job uncertainty and scarcity.16 That is, the comparatively large effects for high-skill 
subgroups with respect to both self-reported racial prejudice and racial labour market gaps 
suggest that high-skill Whites may be utilising racial discrimination as a means to retain 
employment and achieve high wages.  
 
Importantly, we are unable to exclude two additional explanations for the QLFS results. First, 
the costs of discriminatory behaviour could be lower during periods of high unemployment 
due to the greater pool of qualified White applicants to employ and promote. Second, the 
QLFS results could be driven by a converse process, in which affirmative action policies are 
promoted during economic expansions and abandoned during periods of economic recession. 
Both of these explanations imply that racial labour market gaps are counter-cyclical even in 
the absence of increased racial prejudice (tastes for discrimination). Though possible, in light 
of our self-reported racial prejudice results, we believe these additional processes could only 
be partially driving the RLMPs. 
 
Regardless of the exact underlying processes, we robustly find that during recessions White 
workers are more likely to be racially prejudiced and existing racial inequalities in the labour 
market widen. The recent commentary in the popular press and the corresponding statements 
from equality and human rights groups appear correct. This is despite native non-Whites 
achieving similar education levels to Whites in the UK. Given that non-Whites continue to 
experience significant inequalities in health, housing and schooling quality, we argue that 
policy makers must be mindful of how recessions can disproportionately penalise minority 
individuals and should develop policies to avoid these harmful effects in the future. 	  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  These conclusions are robust to the consideration of a number of non-linear specifications, however this 
dynamic may be specific to the UK where ethnic minorities receive a similar number of third level 
qualifications in comparison to Whites.	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Figure 1: Self-Reported Racial Prejudice by Education, Gender and Employment Status 
Figure 2: Self-Reported Racial Prejudice across Time by Gender 
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Figure 3: Cross-Sectional Relationship between Regional Unemployment Rates and Self-
Reported Racial Prejudice 
25
30
35
40
R
ac
ia
l p
re
ju
di
ce
(%
)
4 6 8 10 12 14
Unemployment Rate (%)
Employed Unemployed Retired All others
32	  
Table 1: Probit Models of Self-Reported Racial Prejudice by Gender 
Males Females 
ME SE ME SE 
Unemployment rate 0.004* (0.002) 0.003 (0.005) 
Age -0.003** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Age squared / 100 0.003** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
Number of children -0.011*** (0.004) -0.015*** (0.004) 
Married 0.065*** (0.011) 0.006 (0.011) 
Separated or divorced 0.028*** (0.010) -0.001 (0.015) 
Widowed 0.002 (0.023) -0.029** (0.012) 
Full-time employment 0.038** (0.017) 0.025** (0.012) 
Part-time employment 0.010 (0.018) 0.029*** (0.010) 
Unemployed 0.028 (0.018) 0.025* (0.013) 
Retired 0.022 (0.021) 0.032*** (0.009) 
Full-time student -0.054* (0.031) -0.078*** (0.014) 
Education medium 0.024* (0.013) 0.017* (0.010) 
Education high -0.034** (0.017) -0.059*** (0.013) 
Log income 0.219*** (0.031) 0.104*** (0.034) 
Log income squared -0.043*** (0.007) -0.016** (0.007) 
No party allegiance -0.032*** (0.010) -0.044*** (0.009) 
Labour voter -0.108*** (0.008) -0.097*** (0.010) 
Alliance voter -0.110*** (0.011) -0.081*** (0.011) 
Other party voter  0.074 (0.055) -0.004 (0.040) 
Mean outcome 0.375 0.294 
Pseudo R-squared 0.029 0.031 
Sample size 17641 22066 
Note: Figures are probit marginal effect estimates (ME). Dependent variable equals 
one if a little prejudiced or very prejudiced, and zero otherwise. Included in the model 
but not shown are area-level fixed-effects, area-level linear time trends, and year 
fixed-effects. Standard errors clustered at the area level are shown in parentheses. *, 
** and *** denote statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
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Table 2: Probit Marginal Effects of Unemployment Rate by Subgroups 
Males Females 
ME SE ME SE 
Age 
(1)   18-34 -0.008 (0.008) 0.006 (0.009) 
(2)   35-64 0.017*** (0.004) 0.003 (0.007) 
(3)   65+ -0.018 (0.011) 0.000 (0.006) 
Education 
(4)   Low (no qualifications) -0.011 (0.011) -0.007 (0.005) 
(5)   Medium (CSE / o-levels) 0.011 (0.009) 0.004 (0.008) 
(6)   High (a-levels / degree) 0.013** (0.005) 0.016* (0.009) 
Employment 
(7)   Full-time 0.017*** (0.006) 0.010 (0.008) 
(8)   Full-time or part-time 0.013** (0.006) 0.009 (0.007) 
(9)   Not employed -0.010 (0.008) -0.002 (0.008) 
(10) Retired -0.013 (0.009) 0.010 (0.010) 
Interactions 
(11) 35-64 + high educ 0.032*** (0.011) 0.014 (0.011) 
(12) 35-64 + full-time emp 0.027*** (0.006) 0.012* (0.007) 
(13) high educ + full-time emp 0.020*** (0.006) 0.013 (0.008) 
(14) 35-64 + high educ +  
full-time emp 
0.041*** (0.014) 0.020** (0.009) 
Note: Figures are probit marginal effect estimates for the unemployment rate. Dependent 
variable equals one if a little prejudiced or very prejudiced, and zero otherwise. Included in 
all models are the covariates shown in Table 1, area-level fixed-effects, area-level linear 
time trends, and year fixed-effects. Standard errors clustered at the area level are shown in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively.  
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Table 3: Employment and Log Wage Regression Models by Gender 
Males Females 
Employed Log Wage Employed Log Wage 
Non-White -0.135*** -0.110*** -0.091*** -0.025*** 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) 
UR · Non-White -0.006*** -0.012*** 0.001 -0.014*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Age 0.052*** 0.080*** 0.047*** 0.053*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education medium 0.117*** 0.235*** 0.150*** 0.212*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education high 0.166*** 0.608*** 0.238*** 0.647*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Married -0.086*** 0.192*** -0.299*** 0.233*** 
(0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.012) 
Separated / divorced 0.153*** 0.142*** 0.054*** 0.033*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Number of children 0.010*** 0.065*** 0.006*** -0.006*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Sample size 2234250 435804 2633253 463550 
Note: Figures are estimated coefficients from linear regression models with 1482 time-
region fixed-effects. Log wage models additionally control for work hours and work 
hours squared. Standard errors clustered at the time-region level are shown in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Employment and Log Wage Models for Males by Subgroups 
Employed Log wage 
Non-White UR · Non-White Non-White UR · Non-White 
Age 
(1) 18-34 -0.156*** (0.003) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.104*** (0.007) -0.011*** (0.003) 
(2) 35-64 -0.069*** (0.004) -0.008*** (0.001) -0.124*** (0.010) -0.017*** (0.004) 
Education 
(3) Low -0.126*** (0.006) -0.004** (0.002) -0.077*** (0.014) -0.004 (0.005) 
(4) Medium -0.176*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.001) -0.105*** (0.007) -0.011*** (0.003) 
(5) High -0.069*** (0.003) -0.012*** (0.001) -0.104*** (0.010) -0.015*** (0.004) 
Occupation 
(6) All manual - - -0.092*** (0.008) -0.005 (0.003) 
(7) LS non-manual - - -0.062*** (0.011) -0.011** (0.005) 
(8) HS non-manual - - -0.085*** (0.010) -0.014*** (0.004) 
Work hours 
(9) Part-time - - -0.081*** (0.016) -0.013** (0.006) 
(10) Full-time - - -0.106*** (0.006) -0.011*** (0.003) 
Sector  
(11) Private - - -0.120*** (0.007) -0.016*** (0.003) 
(12) Public - - -0.076*** (0.011) -0.011** (0.004) 
Note: Figures are estimated coefficients on a non-White dummy variable and on the interaction term UR·Non-White from 
linear regression models with 1482 time-region fixed-effects. Rows (7) and (8) present results for ‘low skill’ and ‘high skill’ 
non-manual workers, respectively. Also included but not shown are covariates representing age, educational attainment, 
marital status and children. Standard errors clustered at the time-region level are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Table 5: Disaggregated Racial Wage Gaps for Males 
Employed Log Wage 
All 
Aged 
35-64 
High 
Education All 
Aged 
35-64 
High 
Education 
Black -0.111*** -0.058*** -0.079*** -0.131*** -0.141*** -0.187*** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.018) 
Asian -0.150*** -0.088*** -0.063*** -0.102*** -0.121*** -0.068*** 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.018) (0.012) 
Other ethnicity -0.133*** -0.063*** -0.071*** -0.088*** -0.074*** -0.094*** 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.025) (0.020) 
UR · Black -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.019*** -0.025*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
UR · Asian -0.004*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.019** -0.010* 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) 
UR · Other -0.003* -0.001 -0.009*** -0.011* -0.011 -0.005 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) 
Sample size 2234250 1441422 557760 435804 284075 131904 
Note: Figures are estimated coefficients from linear regression models with 1482 time-region fixed-effects. Also 
included but not shown are covariates representing age, educational attainment, marital status and children. 
Standard errors clustered at the time-region level are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Appendix Table A1: Description of Covariates Used in Analyses of Self-Reported Racial 
Prejudice 
Variable 
Full 
Sample 
Not 
Prejudiced 
Little / very 
Prejudiced 
Male 0.444 0.414 0.505 
Age 48.57 48.31 49.11 
Age squared / 100 26.86 26.63 27.33 
Number of children 0.535 0.550 0.505 
Married 0.598 0.579 0.636 
Separated or divorced 0.115 0.120 0.104 
Widowed 0.114 0.119 0.103 
Full-time employment 0.424 0.407 0.457 
Part-time employment 0.106 0.109 0.100 
Unemployed 0.048 0.049 0.046 
Retired 0.223 0.219 0.232 
Full-time student 0.019 0.022 0.012 
Education medium 0.280 0.267 0.305 
Education high 0.369 0.383 0.339 
Log income 2.578 2.559 2.615 
Log income squared 7.177 7.109 7.314 
No party allegiance 0.107 0.107 0.106 
Labour voter 0.326 0.351 0.273 
Alliance voter 0.115 0.122 0.102 
Other party voter  0.026 0.025 0.029 
Sample size 39707 26615 13092 
Note: All figures are sample means. The omitted (baseline) dummy variables are: 
never married; looking after the home; no educational qualification; 
Conservative party preference.  
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Appendix Table A2: Non-Linear and Dynamic Specifications for Middle Aged, Highly 
Educated, Full-Time Employed Samples 
All 
Females 
(1) 
All Males 
(2) 
Males 
Aged 
35-64 
(3) 
Males 
with High 
Education 
(4) 
Males 
Full-time 
Employed 
(5) 
Interaction 
of Groups 
(3)-(5) 
(6) 
(A) Nonlinear 5 < !"! ≤ 8 0.004 0.020* 0.026 0.008 0.055*** 0.032 
(0.016) (0.011) (0.018) (0.015) (0.012) (0.039) 8 < !"! ≤ 11 0.007 0.017 0.035 0.004 0.077** 0.087* 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.039) (0.018) (0.030) (0.054) 11 < !"! 0.052* 0.027 0.057 0.050* 0.105** 0.183** 
(0.027) (0.030) (0.053) (0.027) (0.048) (0.072) 
(B) Dynamic !"! 0.002 0.003 0.011* 0.019*** 0.018** 0.041** 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.019) !"!!! 0.003 0.003 0.012** -0.012 -0.001 -0.003 
(0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.018) !"!!! -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 0.000 -0.003 0.007 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.008) (0.017) 
(C) Averaged Σ!!!! !"!!! 3 0.002 0.002 0.022*** 0.007 0.016 0.046*** 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) 
Sample size 22066 17641 9245 7346 10433 3352 
Note: Figures are probit marginal effect estimates for the unemployment rate. Dependent variable equals one 
if a little prejudiced or very prejudiced, and zero otherwise. Included in all models are the covariates shown 
in Table X, area-level fixed-effects, area-level linear time trends, and year fixed-effects. Standard errors 
clustered at the area level are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 
and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
38	  
Appendix Table A3: Probit Marginal Effects of Unemployment Rate on Relative Prejudice 
Rates 
All 
Females 
(1) 
All Males 
(2) 
Males 
Aged 
35-64 
(3) 
Males 
with High 
Education 
(4) 
Males 
Full-time 
Employed 
(5) 
Interaction 
of Groups 
(3)-(5) 
(6) 
(A) Less racial prejudice now compared to 5 years ago 
0.001 -0.004 -0.016** -0.001 -0.009 -0.015 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.012) 
(B) Less racial prejudice in 5 years compared to now 
0.002 -0.006** -0.016*** -0.004 -0.013** -0.017*** 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) 
Sample size 20986 16982 8951 7090 10137 3267 
Note: Figures are probit marginal effect estimates for the unemployment rate. Dependent variable 
equals one if the respondent agrees with the statement and zero otherwise. Included in all models are 
the covariates shown in Table 1, area-level fixed-effects, area-level linear time trends, and year 
fixed-effects. Standard errors clustered at the area level are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
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Appendix Table A4: Employment and Log Wage Models for Females by Subgroups 
Employed Log wage 
Non-White UR · Non-White Non-White UR · Non-White 
Age 
(1) 18-34 -0.098*** (0.003) 0.004*** (0.001) -0.023*** (0.006) -0.012*** (0.002) 
(2) 35-64 -0.050*** (0.004) -0.002 (0.002) -0.021** (0.009) -0.016*** (0.004) 
Education 
(3) Low -0.111*** (0.006) 0.002 (0.002) 0.039*** (0.015) -0.003 (0.006) 
(4) Medium -0.115*** (0.004) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.011 (0.007) -0.013*** (0.003) 
(5) High -0.058*** (0.003) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.059*** (0.008) -0.019*** (0.003) 
Occupation 
(6) All manual - - 0.003 (0.011) -0.015*** (0.005) 
(7) LS non-manual - - 0.009 (0.007) -0.009*** (0.003) 
(8) HS non-manual - - -0.046*** (0.008) -0.013*** (0.003) 
Work hours 
(9) Part-time - - -0.016* (0.009) -0.014*** (0.003) 
(10) Full-time - - -0.043*** (0.006) -0.013*** (0.002) 
Sector  
(11) Private - - -0.033*** (0.007) -0.019*** (0.003) 
(12) Public - - -0.010 (0.008) -0.013*** (0.004) 
Note: Figures are estimated coefficients on a non-White dummy variable and on the interaction term UR·Non-White from 
linear regression models with 1482 time-region fixed-effects. Rows (7) and (8) present results for ‘low skill’ and ‘high skill’ 
non-manual workers, respectively. Also included but not shown are covariates representing age, educational attainment, 
marital status and children. Standard errors clustered at the time-region level are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Appendix Table A5: Disaggregated Racial Wage Gaps for Males 
Employed Log Wage 
All 
Aged 
35-64 
High 
Education All 
Aged 
35-64 
High 
Education 
Black -0.039*** 0.010** -0.034*** -0.025*** -0.039*** -0.122*** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) 
Asian -0.124*** -0.135*** -0.073*** -0.031*** 0.004 -0.024** 
(0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.015) (0.010) 
Other ethnicity -0.094*** -0.071*** -0.057*** -0.007 0.009 -0.032* 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013) (0.023) (0.019) 
UR · Black -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.015*** -0.022*** -0.016*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
UR · Asian 0.004*** 0.004 -0.003* -0.012*** -0.004 -0.023*** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
UR · Other -0.002 -0.010*** -0.001 -0.014*** -0.014 -0.005 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) 
Sample size 2633253 1720654 587095 463550 303669 138961 
Note: Figures are estimated coefficients from linear regression models with 1482 time-region fixed-effects. Also 
included but not shown are covariates representing age, educational attainment, marital status and children. 
Standard errors clustered at the time-region level are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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